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From Texas Gulf Sulphur to Chiarella: A
Tale of Two Duties
Donald C. Langevoort*
The Second Circuit’s en banc decision in SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Corp.1
(“TGS”) is well-known for several important holdings. Perhaps the most
celebrated (or condemned) accepted the SEC’s argument that corporate
insiders have a duty to “abstain or disclose” from trading while in possession of
material nonpublic information. The opinion makes a bold claim that the law
in play (Rule 10b-5’s antifraud prohibition) “is based in policy on the justifiable
expectation of the securities marketplace that all investors trading on
impersonal exchanges have relatively equal access to material information.”2
From that comes a command of considerable breadth: “[A]nyone in possession
of material inside information must either disclose it to the investing public, or,
if he is disabled from disclosing it in order to protect a corporate confidence, or
he chooses not to do so, must abstain from trading in or recommending the
securities concerned while such inside information remains undisclosed.”3
Another seminal holding in TGS interprets the language found in both
the statute and rule prohibiting fraud “in connection with the purchase or sale
of a security.” As to that, the court squarely rejected privity as a limitation,
saying that even when the corporation is not itself a purchaser or seller, it still
owes a duty of truthfulness in any communication “reasonably calculated to
influence the investing public.”4 That enlarged the scope of the prohibition to
Thomas Aquinas Reynolds Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. Thanks to Bob
Thompson, Hillary Sale, Steve Bainbridge and Marc Steinberg for helpful comments on earlier drafts.
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401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968)(en banc).
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Id. at 848.
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Id. at 862. The court says that it means publicity disseminated via the financial media.
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include all corporate communications on which investors are likely to rely,
which later came to mean anything material that could foreseeably make its way
into the hands of investors.5
Both of these were blockbuster rulings at the time, causing
consternation in the business community because of the massive private liability
risk that follows if every marketplace trader then had a right to out-of-pocket
damages from either insider trading or false publicity, as TGS implied and class
action plaintiffs soon started claiming.6 But the two holdings had different
fates. Twelve years later, in Chiarella v. United States,7 the Supreme Court
rejected equality as an unrealistic, inefficient touchstone for insider trading
liability, substituting a more conservative fiduciary breach duty standard in its
place. Although the insider trading prohibition under Rule 10b-5 survived, it
was more constricted.8 Some seem to think that the ghost of TGS soon
appeared to incite prosecutors, enforcers and lower court judges to push back
on the constriction and find clever ways of avoiding its fiduciary confines.9 But
as a formal legal matter, at least, insider trading law was put on a straight and
seemingly narrower pathway.
By contrast, the abandonment of privity via the “reasonably calculated”
standard has remained the law to this day. TGS thus gave impetus to a body of
case law to accommodate private damage claims for false corporate publicity,
See In re Carter Wallace Sec. Litig., 216 F.3d 153 (2d Cir. 1998)(liability for misstatements in
medical advertisements).
6
It provoked a powerful and eventually influential critique from Professor David Ruder, who later
became Chairman of the SEC. See David S. Ruder, Texas Gulf Sulphur—The Second Round: Privity and
State of Mind in Rule 10b-5 Purchase and Sale Cases, 63 Nw. U. L. Rev. 423 (1968). On Ruder’s
influence, see Douglas M. Branson, Prescience and Vindication: Federal Courts, Rule 10b-5 and the Work of
David S. Ruder, 85 Nw. U. L. Rev. 613 (1991). As Branson notes, Ruder very early on foresaw the
undisciplined expansion of both insider trading law and corporate liability for false publicity.
7
445 U.S. 222 (1980).
8
See Donald C. Langevoort, Insider Trading and the Fiduciary Principle: A Post-Chiarella Restatement, 70
Cal. L. Rev. 1 (1982). On how Chiarella came to be decided, see A.C. Pritchard, Justice Lewis F.
Powell Jr. and the Counterrevolution in the Federal Securities Laws, 52 Duke L.J. 841, 931-34 (2003).
9
Shorn of ghosts, I have told such a story, as have others from various points of view. See Donald C.
Langevoort, Words from on High About Rule 10b-5: Chiarella’s History, Central Bank’s Future, 21 Del. J.
Corp. L. 865 (1995); see also Donna Nagy, Insider Trading and the Gradual Demise of Fiduciary
Principles, 94 Iowa L. Rev. 1315 (2009); Stephen M. Bainbridge, Insider Trading Regulation: The Path
Dependent Choice Between Property Rights and Securities Fraud, 52 SMU L. Rev. 1589 (1999).
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eventually becoming the “fraud-on-the-market” cause of action blessed by the
Supreme Court in Basic Inc. v. Levinson10 in 1988 and dramatically reaffirmed by
the Court as a matter of stare decisis in 2014.11
This brief Essay on TGS comments on these two journeys.12 As to the latter,
it will not attempt to tell the lengthy and complicated story of how fraud-onthe-market came to be. Instead, it focuses entirely on a somewhat buried (but
potentially explosive) issue raised by the corporate liability portion of TGS: the
corporation’s affirmative duty to disclose material nonpublic information in the
absence of its own trading. Like the insider trading path, this one also stops at
Chiarella, albeit only by implication. There is a strong and unappreciated
connection among the corporate disclosure obligation, the rejection of privity,
and the search for duty in insider trading cases. Though now mostly forgotten
because of all that was swept away in Chiarella’s wake, landmarks along the way
can be pieced together into an interesting story of legal archeology, with some
contemporary relevance.

I. INSIDER TRADING

TGS has long been tagged as an endorsement of investors’ right to expect
equal access to information for trading purposes, which the Supreme Court
485 U.S. 224 (1988). Basic also endorsed the TGS approach to the materiality of speculative
information, using the “probability/magnitude” test for all fraud cases.
11
Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund Inc., 134 S.Ct. 2398 (2014).
12
I leave to elsewhere deeper exploration of the road to TGS. The roots of federal insider trading law
go back to the SEC’s seminal decision in In re Cady Roberts, 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961)(see note --- infra),
to the Supreme Court’s Capital Gains case (see note – infra), the recognition of a duty to disclose in
face to face transactions (see note --- infra), and even to the SEC’s unease with broker dealer firms
that tried to evade fixed commission rates by using insider tips as currency for order flow. On the
latter, see Stanislav Dolgopolov, Insider Trading, Chinese Walls and Brokerage Commissions: The Origins of
Modern Regulation of Information Flows in Securities Markets, 4 J. L. Econ. & Pol. 311 (2008). Useful
contemporaneous assessments of early insider trading law include William Cary, Insider Trading in
Stocks, 21 Bus. Law. 1009 (1965) and Arthur Fleischer, Jr., Securities Trading and Corporate Information
Practices: The Implications of the Texas Gulf Sulphur Proceeding, 51 Va. L. Rev. 1271 (1965), both of
which are cited in TGS.
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later explicitly rejected in Chiarella when it said that “we cannot affirm
petitioner’s conviction without recognizing a general duty between all
participants in market transactions to forego actions based on material,
nonpublic information.”13 But the story is much more complicated.
TGS surely does state that egalitarianism is the new norm, and if that is what
was actually meant, the passionate embrace should not be all that surprising.14
In 1968, the judiciary was at a high point in pursuing a broad, expansive
common law style of securities law jurisprudence, commonly referred to as the
new federal corporation law.15 The Second Circuit had not initially been on
board with this, but two far-reaching Supreme Court opinions (one of which
gave a remarkably expansive meaning to fraud by investment advisers16) called
for action. Under these marching orders, courts were entitled and expected to
add onto statutory obligations based on purely purposive reasoning, even (or
especially) in abrogation of textual or common law solutions to such problems.
So if Judge Waterman and his colleagues on the Second Circuit genuinely
believed that egalitarianism best captured the purpose behind the antifraud
provisions of the securities laws, they needed no text, precedent or legislative
Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 233. The Court did not cite TGS explicitly for this, but did refer to the
lower appellate court opinion that, in turn, borrowed the language from TGS.
14
As Steve Bainbridge points out in his criticism of TGS in this symposium the key paragraph that
promotes marketplace egalitarianism contains non-sequiturs, overbroad language and one-off
citations, obscuring the inventiveness of the philosophy being promoted. Stephen M. Bainbridge,
Equal Access to Information: The Fraud at the Heart of Texas Gulf Sulphur (this volume). Bainbridge thus
concludes that the opinion was a fraud of its own, so that it and all the case law that followed were
(and are) illegitimate. Though I agree that the bold proclamation of an egalitarian ideal and resulting
disclosure duty was new to TGS, I disagree about the illegitimacy, for reasons explained herein.
15
See Arthur Fleischer, Jr., Federal Corporation Law: An Assessment, 78 Harv. L. Rev. 1146 (1964).
Not all agreed that this was legitimate or healthy. E.g., David S. Ruder, Pitfalls in the Development of
Federal Law of Corporations By Implication Through Rule 10b-5, 59 Nw. U. L. Rev. 185 (1964). For a
thorough account of securities law jurisprudence in the Supreme Court and the Second Circuit
during this formative period, see A.C. Pritchard & Robert B. Thompson, Securities Law in the Sixties:
The Supreme Court, the Second Circuit and the Triumph of Purpose over Text (working paper, Sept. 2017).
16
SEC v. Capital Gains Res. Bureau Inc., 375 U.S. 180 (1963). I am persuaded by Adam Pritchard
that Capital Gains plays an especially important causal role in establishing the law of insider trading,
including TGS, in part because it so roundly criticized a more cautious interpretive approach by the
Second Circuit. See A.C. Pritchard, Launching the Insider Trading Revolution: SEC v. Capital Gains
Research Bureau, in STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, ED., RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON INSIDER TRADING 33
(2013). Separately, the Supreme Court had recently countenanced the implied private right of action
in securities cases absent any express statutory foundation. J.I. Case v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
13
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history to fashion doctrine around it. The basic idea that the securities laws,
including Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, were meant to protect investors from
being put or kept in the dark when the truth is available to those in the know is
not an unfair reading of legislative purpose or history.17
In fact, Waterman had already taken a giant step three years earlier when he
held in List v. Fashion Park that insiders had a 10b-5 obligation of affirmative
disclosure when engaged in face-to-face securities transactions.18 Any narrower
view of duty, he says, “contravenes the purpose of Rule 10b-5 in cases like this
. . . which precludes not only the conveyance of half-truths by the buyer which
actually misled the seller, but, as well, failure by the buyer to disclose the full
truth so as to put the seller in an equal bargaining position with the buyer.”
The first seeds of egalitarianism were thus planted. Then he signaled the
expansion to trading in impersonal markets that was to come in TGS (which the
common law refused to do because of lack of reliance), warning that “the effect
of adopting [the strict common law approach to reliance] would be automatically to
exempt many impersonal transactions.”19 The opinion insists on a showing by
plaintiff of reliance on the nondisclosure, but then presumes reliance from the
materiality of what was undisclosed in breach of duty. Analytically, that is the
key step in seeing insider trading as fraud. Nor was this unbounded judicial
inventiveness; less than a decade later, the Supreme Court would endorse that
very same presumption.20 All TGS did, then, was to officially affirm the
extension of List’s duty-based idea to exchange-based trading (“impersonal
transactions”)—i.e., trading triggers a duty to disclose to all marketplace
traders, who are presumptively harmed by being deprived of the information
the insider should have revealed.21

See Joel Seligman, The Reformulation of Federal Securities Law Concerning Nonpublic Information, 73
Geo. L.J. 1083, 1103-15 (1985).
18
List v. Fashion Park Inc., 340 F.2d 457 (2d Cir. 1965)(emphasis added). List is cited in TGS, though
not on the duty question.
19
Id at 462.
20
Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128 (1972). On Affiliated Ute as an endorsement
of the insider trading as fraud teachings of TGS and its progeny, see Pritchard & Thompson, supra.
21
In other words, open market insider trading is not limited by privity either, a conclusion that links
our two journeys. See Part II infra.
17
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Nothing in List or TGS, however, suggests that Waterman was thinking about
anything beyond the classic form of insider trading (or tipping) by corporate
officers, directors and key employees. So why the rhetoric of naked
egalitarianism? Perhaps it was an expansion the judge really wanted to pursue.
Or perhaps Waterman (or his clerk) wrote this paragraph without giving all
that much thought to the implications of his overenthusiastic dicta, intending
mainly just to bless the SEC’s effort—articulated in its seminal Cady Roberts
decision—to define the duty to abstain or disclose by reference to the unfair
exploitation of access to corporate secrets. That was how David Ruder read the
opinion in his influential contemporaneous criticism.22
This argument about provenance would be just an academic debate but for
the suspicion that TGS and its egalitarian philosophy somehow survived the
attempted execution in Chiarella, and survives—or haunts—to this day. My
assessment is different. Even if it is truly what the TGS majority wanted to
impose, I doubt that the egalitarianism rhetoric ever had that much influence
over insider trading doctrine except as a rallying cry for its critics. It dissipated
quickly as a norm. What had staying power instead was the SEC’s considerably
different way of thinking about the insider trading prohibition in Cady Roberts,
which was about duty arising from abuse of status, not mere possession. The
twelve years between TGS and Chiarella made that abundantly clear. The
disdain for egalitarianism that continued—even increased—over the course of
the decade was in response to what Wall Street strategically propped up as the
boogeyman of a naïve and overbroad philosophy, not how the law of insider
trading was being applied.
My point here is not to defend either the court’s opinion in TGS or the
underlying assumption that insider trading is fraud, which is the real sleight of
hand accomplished by both Cady Roberts and TGS. I think there is a rational

Ruder says that notwithstanding the egalitarian dicta, “[m]ost probably . . . the majority did not
intend to establish a ‘possession’ test.” Ruder, supra, at 439 n. 88. He notes in support of his reading
that the language in Waterman’s opinion that follows after the jarring dicta turns to a discussion of
special access, not mere possession.
22
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economic basis for prohibiting insider trading,23 but have long conceded that it
is not deceptive in the way we today insist on for 10b-5 liability.24 It involves
constructive or equitable fraud, perhaps, but not deceit, and plays more of an
expressive, political role in securities regulation than one driven by the
teachings of financial economics.25 So TGS might well be taken to task for an
excess of zealous activism if we are to judge it by today’s more conservative
standards for what it takes to declare a practice unlawful under Rule 10b-5.26
Judged as of its time, however, it fit the zeitgeist of federal corporation law
very well. Not a single judge in TGS—majority, concurrence or (otherwise
apoplectic) dissent—gave any attention to the argument against declaring
insider trading fraudulent, even though it had repeatedly been made by
practitioners and academic commentators.27 And in the forty years since, no
justice or judge has either. That says something about the strength of the desire
to reach the perceived abuses, and not that TGS cast some invisibility potion
over the doctrinal difficulties of using Rule 10b-5 to do so.
But TGS and its egalitarian language are just our journey’s starting point. In
terms both of political economy and administrative practice, the years 1968-80
were a fascinating time period. The SEC was dominated by Republicans for
eight of those years. Watergate, surprisingly, gave the SEC enforcement
apparatus an unexpectedly high profile,28 and the drama and publicity
surrounding insider trading cases no doubt whet the appetite of the staff and
commissioners to bring them more and more aggressively (though the real
publicity pay-offs to the SEC from this aggression would not come until the
1980s). These were the years when Commission first had the inkling that the
For a good recent analysis, see Merritt Fox, Lawrence Glosten & Gabriel Rauterberg, Informed
Trading and its Regulation, 35 Yale. J. Reg. (forthcoming 2017).
24
Langevoort, Fiduciary Principle, supra, at 8.
25
See Donald C. Langevoort, Rereading Cady Roberts: The Ideology and Practice of Insider Trading
Regulation, 99 Colum. L. Rev. 1319 (1999).
26
Similarly, see Richard A. Epstein, Returning to Common-Law Principles of Insider Trading After United
States v. Newman, 125 Yale L.J. 1482, 1508-10 (2016).
27
See William Painter, Growing Pains for the Development of Federal Corporation Law Under Rule 10b-5, 65
Colum. L. Rev. 1361, 1381 (1965). The argument has been repeated without success, including in
arguments made in the Supreme Court’s most recent insider trading case, United States v. Salman. See
Brief for Petitioner, 2016 WL 2732058 at 21-23 (May 6, 2016).
28
See JOEL SELIGMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET 540-41 (3d ed. 2003).
23
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campaign against insider trading gave brand recognition to U.S.-style securities
regulation as “the investors’ champion.”29
This political background is important. Cases like TGS and the many that
soon followed provoked concern among corporate executives, no doubt, but
mixed feelings on Wall Street. A rule that corporate insiders are subject to a
strict “abstain or disclose” obligation might actually be attractive to Wall
Street.30 If the executives and their cronies couldn’t trade, professional traders
would be next in line to exploit any available informational advantages. But that
political equilibrium was an uneasy one, as we are about to see, especially when
enforcers’ attention turned from corporate information to market information.

A. Early Cases

The earliest post-TGS insider trading cases were a mix of SEC enforcement
actions and private class actions, wherein we can indeed find smatterings of
evidence that market egalitarianism was a serious philosophy.31 The class
actions derived from a joinder of the two parts of the Second Circuit’s opinion:
insiders breach a duty to abstain or disclose, and that duty is owed to all
marketplace traders. Thus each trader should be compensated for out-ofpocket damages reflecting losses that would have been avoided had the insider
fully disclosed. Defendants responded by insisting on privity (liability only to
the actual counter-party), pleading that damages under the broader approach
would dwarf the profits they made and be draconian. So much was at stake.

See Langevoort, Cady Roberts, supra.
See, e.g., David Haddock & Jonathan Macey, Regulation on Demand: A Private Interest Model with
Application to Insider Trading Regulation, 30 J. L. & Econ. 311 (1987).
31
Very shortly after TGS, the Second Circuit decided SEC v. Great American Industries Inc., 407
F.2d 453 (2d Cit. 1968)(en banc), with dicta in concurring opinions by three judges—including
Judge Waterman—giving wide scope to the duty to disclose. This is the best evidence that the
egalitarian principle was intended to be the basis for insider trading law.
29
30
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The most important of these early cases arose out of trading in stock of the
Douglas Aircraft Corp. based on tips about an unexpected decline in earnings
that emanated from Merrill Lynch, which was acting as underwriter for a
registered distribution of Douglas debentures. These facts generated two SEC
administrative proceedings32 and a class action for damages,33 plus a separate
case against Douglas for breaching an affirmative duty to disclose.34 As to the
former, the Second Circuit hardly paused before concluding that both tippers
and tippees were liable for all appropriate relief: the conduct of each is equally
reprehensible, and all that is necessary is that the tippee came to possess inside
information, as TGS had said. In the class action, it remanded on the question
of remedy after rejecting defendants’ privity argument, which seemed to
endorse plaintiffs’ theory merging insider trading with fraud-on-the-market.35
In the administrative proceeding involving Investors Management Co., one
of the tippees, the SEC was a bit more careful to elaborate and in so doing drew
far more from Cady Roberts than from TGS. For the first time, it set out the
elements of an insider trading case in terms not only of materiality but duty,
knowledge and the misuse of the information. As to duty, the majority’s
articulation was that “one who obtains possession of material, non-public
corporate information, which he has reason to know emanates from a corporate
source, and which by itself places him in a position superior to other investors,
thereby acquires a relationship with respect to that information within the
purview and restraints of the antifraud provisions.”36 That is consistent with
TGS, to be sure, but starts to draw a more elaborate framework for liability
In re Investors Management Corp., 44 S.E.C. 633 (1971); In re Merrill Lynch Pierce Fenner &
Smith, 43 S.E.C. 933 (1968).
33
Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch Pierce Fenner & Smith, 495 F.2d 228 (2d Cir. 1974). Also important
from the same year was an unrelated case, SEC v. Shapiro, 494 F.2d 1301 (2d Cir. 1974), which
extended the insider trading prohibition to situations where the insider buys stock in the shares of a
company with which he has no relationship, because he knows of an action by his employer or client
that will affect the other company’s stock price.
34
Financial Indus. Fund v. McDonnell-Douglas Corp., 474 F.2d 514 (10th Cir. 1973).
35
In Shapiro, the court did urge flexibility by the trial court on the remedy issue. 495 F.2d at 242.
Eventually, the Second Circuit settled on an approach to damages that effectively limited class
recovery to the insiders’ profits, which dampened plaintiffs’ enthusiasm for such cases. See Elkind v.
Liggett & Myers Inc., 635 F.2d 156 (2d Cir. 1980).
36
44 S.E.C. at 649-50.
32
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than simple possession. Investors Management is best known, however, for a
concurrence by Commissioner Richard Smith, who explicitly raised doubts
about the impact of too much market egalitarianism on smoothly functioning
markets. He thus offered an even more refined test, with liability only when
the tippee acts “knowing or having reason to know that the material non-public
information became available to them in breach of a duty owed to the
corporation not to disclose or use the information for non-corporate purposes.
Such knowledge, in effect, renders the tippee a participant in the breach of duty
when he acts on the basis of the information received.”37 Readers familiar with
Chiarella and the subsequent Dirks decision will note how close this is to how
the Supreme Court eventually framed tipper-tippee law, although Smith
(unlike Justice Powell later on) denied in his concurrence that fiduciary duty
should be the only kind of duty to the corporation that might be breached so as
to create tippee liability.38
So if some seeds of egalitarianism may have been planted by TGS, they bore
surprisingly little fruit. Duty was clearly becoming status-based, not
possession-based. To be sure, there were still echoes to be found in some
unofficial SEC staff remarks and aggressive enforcement actions that were
settled, not litigated.39 But at its highest levels, at least, the SEC had come to
realize that a broad enforcement challenge to common information-gathering
behaviors by analysts, traders and others was neither a sustainable litigation
strategy nor particularly good policy or politics. In 1976, SEC Commissioner
Philip Loomis (who as General Counsel had argued TGS in the Second Circuit)
signaled this recognition in an important speech, saying “the concept of equality

Id. at 650 n.2.
He said that “purloined” information would satisfy the test because “a duty not to steal or
knowingly receive stolen goods or exercise dominion over goods known to be owned by others exists
toward the corporation even without the presence of a special relationship.” Id. at n.2.
39
This is noted in an important law review article, which noted that the case law had not yet taken
the TGS rhetoric to its logical conclusion notwithstanding occasional noises in that direction. See
Arthur Fleischer, Robert Mundheim & John C. Murphy, An Initial Inquiry into the Obligation to Disclose
Market Information, 121 U. Pa. L. Rev. 798 (1973).
37
38
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of information goes too far. It not only lacks an adequate basis in the law of
fraud but is also an impractical standard.”40

B. The Proposed Federal Securities Code

Also worth some mention as a matter of intellectual legal history on insider
trading in the 1970s is the American Law Institute’s Federal Securities Code,
designed to replace the statutory and case law that had grown so fast with a
carefully crafted statute. The monumental effort was led by Louis Loss of
Harvard and Milton Cohen, the architect of the SEC’s Special Study of the
Securities Markets, out of which came the first calls for codification.41 They
were supported by much of the legal establishment, including Judge Henry
Friendly of the Second Circuit.42 The effort would ultimately fail, but for a
time it reflected what many considered the best available thinking about
securities regulation.
Obviously, insider trading was a challenge for the Code’s drafters, who
squarely rejected any “universally applicable theory of ‘market
egalitarianism.’”43 Following David Ruder’s prodding, they read TGS (and the
state of the law) narrowly, treating the egalitarian ideal as loose dicta. Thus
they gave a fairly conventional scope as to the definition of insider, and created
a knowledge-based test for tippee liability. Their express prohibition stopped
with that, though they did say that in especially egregious cases of abuse by
“quasi-insiders,” a back-up general antifraud prohibition might be invoked.
Remarks of Philip A. Loomis, Jr., Some Reflections on Rule 10b-5 and Market Information, May
6, 1976, at 12-13, available at https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/1976/050676loomis.pdf.
41
For comments on the Code project, see Donald C. Langevoort, The Education of a Securities Lawyer
(book review of L. Loss, Fundamentals of Securities Regulation), 80 Nw. U. L. Rev. 259, 265-67
(1985).
42
Friendly’s role in securities cases was interesting and profound, partly based on a close relationship
to Louis Loss. See Margaret V. Sachs, Judge Friendly and the Law of Securities Regulation: The Creation of
a Judicial Reputation, 50 SMU L. Rev. 777 (1997).
43
ALI Federal Securities Code sec. 1603 comment 3(d) at 663.
40
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Here again, we see important sources of law moving even further away from
any spell TGS might have cast.

C. The Tender Offer Conundrum

By 1968, the takeover wars were booming, and in the same year
Congress passed the Williams Act amendments to the Securities Exchange Act.
New section 13(d) required disclosure by bidders of acquisitions of securities
on the open market or otherwise when beneficial ownership passed a 5%
threshold. The implication, of course, was that issuers could buy stock secretly
up to that point, even when they had private inside knowledge of their own
plans and intentions. That alone—as the Second Circuit soon44 and the
Supreme Court later on pointed out—indicated that equal access would never
work as a simple theory of liability. The SEC commenced a major special study
of the role of institutional investors in the securities markets, confirming after
considerable analysis that the corporate takeover setting (including the
controversial practice of warehousing45) was too challenging to employ insider
trading rules based simply on egalitarian principles,46 calling instead for
rulemaking under the broader regulatory authority given to the SEC in Section
14(e) by additional Williams Act amendments in 1970.
Ultimately, that happened, though not until after Chiarella. The story is
worth noting, however. At first glance, the rule as adopted (and more so as
initially proposed) was very broad and seemingly in synch with the egalitarian
approach found in TGS. Read more closely closely, however, Rule 14e-3 seems
more attendant to the unique set of interests at stake in hostile takeovers than
trading practices generally, and was filled with exceptions that their authors in
And the Second Circuit so held very shortly after TGS. General Time Inc. v. Talley Indus., 403
F.2d 169, 174 (2d Cir. 1968).
45 Warehousing is the deliberate communication of the bidder’s intent to launch the tender offer to
traders whose purchases would put more of the stock in bidder-friendly hands. See Fleischer,
Mundheim & Murphy, supra.
46
See id.
44
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the Division of Corporation Finance saw as countering the lingering egalitarian
leanings of the Enforcement Division.47 Warehousing was forbidden, but
otherwise the rules were drawn to assure that they did not interfere with
common market practices. The final proposal also created an explicit “Chinese
Wall” defense for multi-service financial institutions, more protective than
what had been articulated by the Commission in an amicus brief a few years
earlier.48

D. Chiarella

All of the underlying angst about the right grounding for insider trading law
came together in the prosecution of Vincent Chiarella, which commenced in
early 1978. As is well known, he was an employee at a financial printer, who
was able to determine the names of about-to-be targets of a surprise takeover
bid from yet non-public disclosure documents being printed on behalf of the
bidders. He bought target stock and options, and profited handsomely for
someone of his means. This was a path-breaking criminal insider trading case,
which produced a good bit of shock and awe on Wall Street among those who
from time to time receive market-related secrets.

See Oral History by Richard Rowe, SEC Historical Society Virtual Museum, May 24, 2004, at 3334.
The
entire
transcript
is
available
at
http://3197d6d14b5f19f2f4405e13d29c4c016cf96cbbfd197c579b45.r81.cf1.rackcdn.com/collection/oralhistories/rowe052404Tanscript.pdf.
48
The issue in Slade v. Shearson Hammill & Co., Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) par. 94329 (S.D.N.Y.
1974) was whether a securities firm could use the existence of a “Chinese Wall” as a legal defense
when accused of violating a duty to its customers by recommending purchases contrary to inside
information held in other departments of the firm. The district court said not, relying heavily on the
rhetoric in TGS. In an amicus brief on appeal, the SEC largely agreed, urging the use of such walls
but simply as a prudential matter; the wall would not necessarily relieve the firm of liability for its illfounded recommendations. In contrast, Rule 14e-3 made the wall an explicit defense to the insider
trading itself. For a discussion, see Norman S. Poser, Chinese Wall or Emperor’s New Clothes?: Regulating
Conflicts of Interest of Securities Firms in the US and UK, 9 Mich. J. Int’l L. 91, 108 (1988).
47
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The Second Circuit’s opinion49 affirming Chiarella’s conviction is interesting
and shows how much the intervening decade had altered the understanding of
what constitutes insider trading. The opinion does start with an homage to
TGS, quoting the egalitarian dicta and the broad liability standard. But it then
fashions a revised test as to who is covered under Rule 10b-5: “Anyone,
corporate insider or not, who regularly receives material nonpublic information
may not use that information to trade in securities without incurring an
affirmative duty to disclose.”50 This was status-based, not simple possession,
and thus far closer to Cady Roberts than TGS. To stress the limitation, the court
said that this principle is an effort to prevent abuse—wrongfully exploiting that
status of regular access to information, knowing that the information was not
theirs for the taking. In support, the majority invoked the Federal Securities
Code as allowing the stretch to reach such an “egregious” case of misconduct.
Summarizing, and saying exactly the opposite of what the Supreme Court
would later say it said, the opinion emphasizes that “[w]e are not to be
understood as holding that no one may trade on nonpublic market information
without incurring a duty to disclose.”51
The Second Circuit’s approach, then, was far from the simple norm TGS had
articulated or the Supreme Court later ascribed to it. But when the case went
up to the Court, the defense side (aided by a large segment of the Wall Street
community) portrayed it as a warmed-over TGS, and a naïve and careless threat
to how markets work. And in a moment largely now forgotten, the Justice
Department chose not to defend the Second Circuit’s philosophy or approach.
As the Chiarella case was being litigated below, the initial briefing and
arguments were in line with the flexible access equals duty approach of prior
case law, which had persuaded the Second Circuit. But when the Solicitor
United States v. Chiarella, 588 F.2d 1358 (2d Cir. 1978).
Id. at 1365.
51
Id. at 1366 (emphasis added). None of this, however, was enough to avoid a dissenting vote from
Judge Meskill, who wanted to confine TGS to its original scope, shorn of any hint of market
egalitarianism. To be fair to the Supreme Court, the Second Circuit does contradict itself in both
affirming and denying egalitarianism. But the test it applies is clearly not simple egalitarianism but
rather the fashioning of a federal law duty corresponding to the category of persons whose misuse of
confidential information made available to them can be characterized as abusive, i.e., a natural
extension of Cady Roberts, if not TGS.
49
50
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General’s office took over the case, the argument shifted considerably. The
two primary lawyers on the case were Stephen Shapiro and Kenneth Geller,
now lions of the Supreme Court bar and authors of the standard treatise on
Supreme Court practice; up until just before Chiarella, their boss at the SG’s
office was Frank Easterbrook, who would soon have much to say about insider
trading theory52 and presumably guided their thinking even after his departure.
Shapiro and Geller essentially dropped all reference to duty as theretofore
understood, and explicitly disavowed any support for market egalitarianism.53
Instead, they essentially bet all the marbles on treating Chiarella’s behavior as a
misappropriation and hence a fraud because it deceived the source of the
information and because misappropriation itself triggers a duty to disclose. That
bet failed on procedural grounds, though of course the former version of the
misappropriation theory did prevail in later cases and, eventually, the Supreme
Court.54
In sum, the egalitarianism expressed in TGS was long gone by the time
Justice Powell wrote the Court’s opinion in Chiarella. The case law had moved
on to look for firmer grounding; Easterbrook, Shapiro and Geller wanted a
completely fresh start. Powell is thus wrong when he says that petitioner’s
conviction could not be affirmed without resort to equal access, but there were
no advocates before him pushing for a capacious form of duty or pointing out
the consequences of his “fiduciary duty only” test.55 That had implications
beyond insider trading, as we are about to see.
So this journey stops, but not really. As noted earlier, the spirit of TGS did
return to push against the newly narrowed insider trading prohibition, and the
See Frank Easterbrook, Insider Trading, Secret Agents, Evidentiary Privileges and the Production of
Information, 1981 S. Ct. Rev. 309.
53
Brief for the United States, 1979 WL 213521 (1979), especially fn. 48.
54
United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642 (1997).
55
That would be left to the dissenters, Chief Justice Burger and Justices Blackmun and Marshall. The
Blackmun-Marshall dissent was very much a continuation of the Second Circuit’s wrongfulness
approach, given a bit more intellectual definition and heft via an elaboration by Victor Brudney in a
widely-cited law review article. See Victor Brudney, Insiders, Outsiders and Informational Advantages
under the Federal Securities Laws, 93 Harv. L. Rev. 322 (1979). To be precise, the majority in Chiarella
did not reject the possibility that there might be other bases (i.e., misappropriation) for the duty to
disclose to other marketplace traders, but to this day that possibility has not been taken up directly.
52
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nearly four decades since Chiarella have shown much more expansion than
limitation in insider trading doctrine. Much of this came from the embrace of
misappropriation, as the Easterbrook-Shapiro-Geller team hoped. While
misappropriation can be seen as a property rights-based construct, its
application also brought back into the federal prohibition a great deal of
misconduct that touches the nerve of egalitarianism’s believers. Ghostly or not,
some remnants of the old egalitarianism exist to this day, mainly in portions of
insider trading law outside the control of the federal courts where a handful of
true believers can still be found—the SEC’s Regulation FD, state-law litigation
like the New York State Attorney General’s “Insider Trading 2.0”56 and
statutory reform proposals popping up from time to time in Congress that
harken back to the old idealism.57
Whether one prefers egalitarianism in insider trading regulation, Powell’s
fiduciary duty test, no regulation, or something in between depends on a host
of beliefs—about fairness, market efficiency, property rights, the economics of
adverse selection, due process, statutory interpretation, judicial activism, and
much more—that are well beyond the scope of this Essay. TGS may reflect an
excess of activism, but the reaction in Chiarella isn’t a shining example of
judicial conservatism either: it ignores the deception requirement conundrum
the same as TGS did, cites Cady Roberts as if thoroughly supportive of its
decision, anchors without any textual justification on a state common law
principle (fiduciary duty) that otherwise had been rejected as a federal
securities fraud touchstone, and then promotes that principle as if the exclusive
source of duty, which it never was in the common law. All this makes the
limiting fiduciary principle look more grounded in authority than it really
was.58 But to me, this is just how judges move indeterminate law in the
These are efforts to attack institutional practices that promote unequal access to material
information. On Insider Trading 2.0 and Reg FD, see DONALD C. LANGEVOORT, SELLING HOPE,
SELLING RISK: CORPORATIONS, WALL STREET AND THE DILEMMAS OF INVESTOR PROTECTION 82-84
(2016); Fox et al., supra.
57
E.g., S. 702, 114th Cong., 1st Sess., March 11, 2015 (introduced by Senators Reed and Menendez).
58
A fair reading of Chiarella is that it imposes the fiduciary principle not out of ignorance of the
common law of fraud but instead out of the conservative instinct that when doctrine is lacking in
textual authority, it should be applied narrowly. This principle invites Congress (or perhaps the
SEC) to undertake any desired expansion, not judges. Powell’s deep understanding and appreciation
56
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direction they see fit. TGS and Chiarella are each the product of the perceived
judicial norms of its time.

II. THE CORPORATION’S AFFIRMATIVE DUTY TO DISCLOSE

The portion TGS that abandons any privity requirement does not speak in
terms of fashioning federal corporation law, but instead just fleshing out the
meaning of the words “in connection with the purchase or sale of a security”
found in both Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. But it is very much an extension
of the duty-based thinking expressed in the first part of the opinion.59 It
effectively declares that issuers owe a duty of truthfulness to all marketplace
traders simply because the publicity in question is reasonably calculated to
influence them, and strongly implies what the business community feared:
those to whom the duty is breached have a right to sue for out-of-pocket
damages. In so doing, and to the consternation of Judge Henry Friendly,
whose concurring opinion in TGS is almost as famous as the majority’s, the
court refused to place any state of mind limitations (i.e., requiring scienter) on
the aggressive holding. It is probably fair to say that the reaction to the absence
of limitations in this portion of TGS started the groundswell—again, both
intellectual and political—that finally provoked the Supreme Court to turn

for fiduciary duty in the business setting made him willing to tolerate that scope to a non-textual
body of insider trading law, but not want to venture any further into inventive duty-creation that
might threaten the free functioning of the financial markets. See Pritchard, Powell, supra. I also think
he would have been reluctant to gut insider trading law because of the extent to which it had taken
on an expressive function in countering perceptions of capital markets in the U.S. dominated by
irresponsible greed. See Donald C. Langevoort, “Fine Distinctions” in the Contemporary Law of Insider
Trading, 2013 Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 429, 432-33.
59
Duty in tort law addresses when and why some act by the defendant requires compensation to the
victim. As to fraud, see John C.P. Goldberg, Anthony Sebok & Benjamin Zipursky, The Place of
Reliance in Fraud, 48 Ariz. L. Rev. 1001, 1003 (2006). In cases of fraudulent misrepresentation,
courts generally say that no pre-existing duty is needed to grant standing to a victim so long as the
TGS test is satisfied. See Deutchman v. Beneficial Corp., 841 F.2d 502 (3d Cir. 1988).
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away in securities cases from expansiveness in the mid-70s and substitute a
more formalist/textualist style of judging.60
Yet notwithstanding that eventual turn away from a federal common law of
corporations, the “reasonably calculated” standard survived and flourished.
Here, again, TGS is just a starting point; the phrase “reasonably calculated” is
actually quite ambiguous. This phrase could connote that liability follows only if
the issuer had some desire or purpose to mislead investors.61 Later cases would
reject that, however, in favor of insisting only that reliance by investors be
foreseeable given the medium of dissemination that was chosen.62 TGS thus
opened the door to the emergence of the fraud-on-the-market lawsuit that the
Supreme Court blessed in Basic amidst all the conservative retrenchment that
was otherwise going on. But I have written elsewhere about how and why that
might have occurred, and need not repeat myself here.63
For now I am more interested in what happened to the law relating to a
crucial question of that time: when, if ever, does the issuer have an affirmative
duty to disclose material information in its possession? Even before TGS, the
law had come to the view that the issuer trading in its own shares generally
does have a duty to abstain or disclose much the same as its insiders,64 so that
issuer repurchases are impermissible unless the company has revealed material
good news in its possession (an idea much more coherent with TGS than
See Branson, supra.
See COX ET AL., supra, at 707.
62
I do still wonder what would have happened had a more purpose or motive-based interpretation of
reasonably calculated had taken hold. For a case that might be read as imposing such a limitation, see
Ontario Public Service Employees Pension Trust Fund v. Nortel Networks Inc., 369 F.3d 27 (2d
Cir. 2004), denying standing to purchasers of the stock in JDS Uniphase to sue Nortel for
misstatements about its own financial condition even though the misstatements might have altered
the total mix of information about JDS, which was a major supplier to Nortel; see also ECA & Local
134 IBEW Joint Pension Trust v. J.P. Morgan Chase Co., 553 F.3d 187, 203 (2d Cir. 2009).
63
See Donald C. Langevoort, Basic at Twenty: Rethinking Fraud on the Market, 2009 Wisc. L. Rev.
151. Key to the story is the work of two conservative academics, Frank Easterbrook and Daniel
Fischel, who were very supportive of fraud-on-the-market because of its promise to substitute the
use of financial economics tools for the more subjective assessments ordinarily made by judges and
juries.
64
See Mark Loewenstein & William Wang, The Corporation as Insider Trader, 30 Del. J. Corp. L. 45
(2005). There are occasional lingering doubts about this, though they have not undermined the
general principle. See Langevoort & Gulati, supra.
60
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Chiarella). But what if there was no trading by the issuer? While the en banc
opinion does not have to address this, the companion private actions did, posing
the question of whether TGS had a duty to correct rumors about the mineral
discovery floating about in the marketplace.65
The opinion in TGS did say enough to lead observers to see a general duty to
disclose looming if not fully fledged—footnote 12 said that issuers can delay
disclosure for business reasons, which implied that they would have to disclose
without such reasons.66 So did a number of other cases,67 albeit always in dicta,
including the one coming out of the McDonnell Douglas matter noted earlier.68
Such a disclosure obligation would be coherent with the spirit of equal access,
because prompt disclosure is a principal mechanism by which market prices
could stay close to fundamental value for the benefit of all traders,69 and make
ample policy sense so long (as the footnote in TGS suggested) as there was some
business judgment discretion given to issuers to keep secrets when there was a
compelling competitive need for secrecy. But surprisingly, this never ripened
into an obligation, although it did spawn the articulations of two narrower
affirmative disclosure duties—the “duty to correct” and the “duty to update”—
both of which survive to this day.70
Although it was not entirely clear at the time, Chiarella was once again a hard
stop to what TGS began. The holding there in the insider trading context that
no duty exists simply because of possession extends to all forms of the duty to
disclose. Fiduciary obligation is of no help, because the issuer itself has no

See Mitchell v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Corp., 446 F.2d 90, 100 (10th Cir. 1971).
So read by David Ruder in his influential criticism. See Ruder, supra, at 442-44.
67
Especially Goldberg v. Meridor, 567 F.2d 209, 221 n.10 (2d Cir. 1977), which was the Second
Circuit’s response to Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977)(rejecting breach of fiduciary
duty as a form of deception under 10b-5). The SEC was also strongly suggesting an affirmative duty
to disclose. Exch. Act Rel. No. 8995, [1970-71 Tr. Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) par. 77915
(Oct. 15, 1970).
68
Financial Industrial Fund v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 474 F.2d 514, 521 (10th Cir. 1973).
69
For a thorough review of the case law as of the eve of Chiarella and a recommendation that such a
duty to recognized, see Jeffrey D. Bauman, Rule 10b-5 and the Corporation’s Duty to Disclose, 67 Geo.
L.J. 933 (1979).
70
COX ET AL., supra, at 723-24. On their derivations, see Bauman, supra, at 963-72.
65
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fiduciary duty to disclose when it is not trading.71 Any doubt about this that
might have lingered in the courts was then finally disposed of, ironically, in a
footnote in Basic Inc. v. Levinson, squarely indicating that non-trading issuers
have no duty arising from the mere possession of material nonpublic
information.72
My assessment here is much the same as with respect to the insider trading
narrative—the law could and should have evolved differently. To use a
limited, truncated vision of fiduciary duty as the only source of a duty to
disclose effectively says that corporate managers can keep secrets that harm
investors even when the secrecy is simply to avoid embarrassment, blame or
loss of the perquisites of power. That has not set well with the courts, creating
a “muddled” case law as courts have to reach to the amorphous half-truth
doctrine and other limited duty theories in an effort to get better results.73 The
result has been inconsistency, at best; too many troubling results, at worst.
Here, too, I think we would have been better off letting the law inspired by
TGS to run its course, working incrementally toward a flexible, coherent duty
that would put more pressure on issuers to disclose promptly when their
disinclination to do so lacks a true business purpose.

III. CONCLUSION

The fast-developing jurisprudence of Rule 10b-5 was dominated by the
search for a theory of duty suitable for the modern capital markets, for which
older notions of privity were unsuitable. In Chiarella, the Supreme Court
truncated two doctrinal journeys for which TGS might be seen as a starting
For more contemporary statement of the limited fiduciary duty of candor, see Malone v. Brincat,
722 A.2d 5 (Del. 1998).
72
485 U.S. 224 n. 17 (1988).
73
See Donald C. Langevoort & G. Mitu Gulati, The Muddled Duty to Disclose Under Rule 10b-5, 57
Vand. L. Rev. 1639 (2004). The U.S. approach is not in synch with the rest of the world. See Marc
Steinberg, Insider Trading, Selective Disclosure and Prompt Disclosure: A Comparative Analysis, 22 U. Pa. J.
Int’l Econ. L. 635 (2001).
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point—one on the scope of the insider trading prohibition, the other on the
public corporation’s affirmative duty to disclose. For each of these, my
reaction is the same: while what TGS said or implied was overbroad and needed
substantial refinement, that work soon began and was in progress over the
twelve years in between the two decisions. Securities law would have been
better off, I suspect, had both journeys been permitted to continue without the
scuttling.
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